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Abstract. TR-069 is a standard for the remote management of end-
user devices by service providers. Despite being implemented in nearly
a billion devices, almost no research has been published on the secu-
rity and privacy aspects of TR-069. The first contribution of this paper
is a study of the TR-069 ecosystem and techniques to inspect TR-069
communication. We find that the majority of analyzed providers do not
use recommended security measures, such as TLS. Second, we present a
TR-069 honeyclient to both analyze TR-069 behavior of providers and
test configuration servers for security vulnerabilities. We find that pop-
ular open-source configuration servers use insecure methods to authenti-
cate clients. TR-069 implementations based on these servers expose, for
instance, their users’ internet telephony credentials. Third, we develop
components for a distributed system to continuously monitor activities in
providers’ TR-069 deployments. Our setup consists of inexpensive hard-
ware sensors deployed on customer premises and centralized log collec-
tors. We perform real-world measurements and find that the purported
security benefits of TR-069 are not realized as providers’ firmware update
processes are lacking.
Keywords: TR-069, CWMP, ACS, Customer Premises Equipment, Re-
mote Management, User Privacy, Monitoring, Honeyclient
1 Introduction
TR-069 is a technical specification that defines a protocol for the remote man-
agement of end-user devices by (internet) service providers. Published by the
Broadband Forum, it is also endorsed by a variety of other initiatives (e.g. the
DVB Project and the WiMAX Forum). TR-069 is implemented in nearly a billion
residential gateways, set-top boxes and other home broadband equipment [39].
While TR-069 simplifies device setup for consumers, it provides service
providers with unrestricted access to the managed device. This may compro-
mise users’ privacy and security expectations in a number of ways: First, service
providers can read and write any data on controlled devices. They can query
routers for connected devices, obtain television viewing statistics from set-top
Source Code Repository: https://github.com/mhils/tr069
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boxes, or install new firmware. These operations are generally opaque to users
and the protocol does not specify a way to seek users’ consent. Second, a con-
figuration server can identify connected users and provide tailored firmware to
individuals of interest. Providers may be coerced to help authorities to pivot into
otherwise protected networks. Third, the configuration server used by a service
provider to control TR-069 clients is a single point of failure. If compromised, an
attacker gains control over all connected devices. Fourth, TR-069 devices accept
HTTP requests on port 7547 in order to initiate sessions. This exposes them to
direct attacks.
Arguably, TR-069’s ubiquity and opaqueness make it an attractive platform
for privacy-infringing data collection, attacks by criminals, or targeted surveil-
lance. For example, attacks on TR-069 devices have contributed to the quick
growth of the Mirai botnet and caused widespread internet outages in Germany
in 2016 [4]. Even though internet-wide scanning has shown that port 7547 is
the third most exposed port on the internet [5,12], very little research has been
published on the protocol’s security. So far, researchers have primarily pointed
out specific implementation vulnerabilities in clients and configuration servers
[35,37]. This paper takes a broader look at the TR-069 ecosystem from a security
and privacy perspective.
We will first give a security-centric overview of TR-069 in Section 2. As the
first contribution of this paper, we discuss different methods to inspect TR-
069 connections and compare their practical feasibility in Section 3. This allows
researchers and proficient users to view and analyze which data is communicated
by TR-069-enabled devices in practice. We extract TR-069 configurations from
firmware update packages and search them for TR-069 credentials. We find that
the majority of providers do not follow recommended security practices.
In Section 4, we introduce an open-source TR-069 client that can be used
to analyze configuration servers. By emulating a real TR-069 device, the client
can determine which data is regularly accessed by the service provider during
normal operation or which firmware is deployed to users. This client can also
be used to find security vulnerabilities in configuration servers. To demonstrate
this application, we test two open-source configuration servers with our client.
We find that both do not authenticate clients securely and can be tricked into
exposing other users’ credentials. As the issues we uncover are not specific to
the individual implementations, our findings point to widespread issues regarding
client authentication in the TR-069 landscape.
Looking at the implementation of TR-069 in practice, it is interesting to
compare how different service providers make use of the protocol. Section 5
presents a sensor software to monitor individual TR-069 devices for privacy
infringements and other undesired actions. To make running the sensor practical,
we show how a small and inexpensive router can be turned into a long-term
TR-069 monitoring platform. We perform measurements of real-world TR-069
traffic over a period of twelve months. We do not observe privacy violations by
providers, but we find that the the purported security benefits of TR-069, such
as the automated deployment of security updates, are not realized.
We discuss our findings in Section 6, review related work in Section 7, and
conclude in Section 8. Given the sensitive nature of TR-069 communications, we
document our approach to research ethics and privacy in Appendix A.
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Fig. 1: Basic TR-069 network topology.
2 Preliminaries
TR-069 is a technical report that defines an application layer protocol for
the remote management of end-user routers, modems, set-top boxes and other
Customer Premises Equipment (CPE) [6]. It specifies generic methods that can
be applied to manage different types of devices. Additional technical reports
specify the data models for concrete device classes or services [38].
TR-069 was initially published in 2004 by the Broadband Forum1 as a means
to configure home routers and business internet gateways, but has since then
evolved to cover Voice over IP (VoIP) products, video set-top boxes, network
attached storage, femto cells, and other networked products [25]. TR-069 is en-
dorsed by other initiatives, such as the Digital Video Broadcasting consortiu-
mand the WiMAX Forum. While the protocol defined in TR-069 is formally
entitled CPE WAN Management Protocol (CWMP), both terms are used inter-
changeably in practice and we will stick with the better known TR-069. Unless
otherwise noted, this paper refers to TR-069 Amendment 6 (CWMP Version 1.4)
published in April 2018 [6].
In the following, we first describe the goals of TR-069 and then provide a
technical introduction to the protocol.
2.1 TR-069 Goals
On a functional level, TR-069 covers a wide range of use cases for network
providers. We briefly recall the key features to give readers a better understand-
ing of TR-069 usage in practice.
“Zero-Touch” Installation. TR-069 is often used for auto-provisioning of new
devices, which simplifies the setup procedure for new customers and thereby
reduces support costs. Customers are provided with a modem or router that
just needs to be connected to the network. It automatically contacts the
provider’s Auto Configuration Server (ACS) to receive its configuration (e.g.
VoIP credentials).
1 The Broadband Forum is a non-profit industry consortium that defines standards
for broadband networking. Members include internet and telecommunications service
providers as well as device vendors.
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Firmware Maintenance. Providers can deploy firmware updates to their cus-
tomers without requiring user interaction.
Diagnostics for Customer Troubleshooting. Customer service agents can
remotely access diagnostic information and modify configuration settings of
TR-069 devices to help users with troubleshooting their network.
Configuration and Activation of New Services. TR-069 can be used to
remotely (de-)activate services or features on a customer’s device. For exam-
ple, some providers charge a monthly fee for activating the router’s wireless
module. Wireless network functionality is activated remotely via TR-069
when a customer subscribes to the service.
Each of TR-069’s use cases comes with its own set of security and privacy chal-
lenges. While TR-069 introduces elements that could potentially improve user
security (e.g. automated firmware updates), we suppose that its adoption is pri-
marily motivated by prospective reductions in service and support costs.
2.2 TR-069 Protocol
Here we provide a short introduction to the TR-069 protocol. As the official
specification counts 276 pages (excluding data models), we do not aim to provide
a comprehensive overview but focus on the parts relevant for this paper. We
assume the reader to be familiar with TCP/IP, TLS and HTTP.
Fundamentally, TR-069 describes the interaction between an Auto Configuration
Server (ACS) and a TR-069 client (hereinafter “client”). Figure 1 shows an exam-
ple topology: TR-069 communication usually happens only within a provider’s
network, with the client being located on customer premises and the ACS being
part of the service provider’s infrastructure. However, some vendors also offer
configuration servers as Software-as-a-Service in the cloud.
On a high level, connections follow the structure shown in Figure 2. A TR-069
session is always initiated by the client, which establishes a TCP connection
with the ACS. Second, the connection is optionally secured using TLS. Third,
the client sends a series of commands to the server. Finally, the ACS sends a
series of commands to the client before the connection is terminated. We discuss
each step in more detail below.
ACS Discovery Before making first contact with an ACS, a client needs to
learn the ACS URL it is supposed to contact. TR-069 defines three mechanisms
for this: The use of a preconfigured ACS URL, configuration via a LAN-side
protocol (e.g. a router web interface or TR-064 [22]), or configuration via DHCP
options 43 and 125 during IP address assignment.
It is noteworthy that the ACS URL determines whether the connection will
be secured using TLS. While the TR-069 specification recommends the use of
TLS, it is not a mandatory part of the protocol. Therefore, control over the ACS
URL can be used to downgrade the security of TR-069 sessions. In particular,
the DHCP discovery mechanism is prone to man-in-the-middle attacks unless
otherwise secured [6, p. 34].
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Fig. 2: High-level view on a TR-069 session.
Connection Establishment As the first step of a TR-069 session, the client
opens a TCP connection to the hostname specified in the configured ACS URL.
TR-069 sessions are always initiated by the client as a reaction to one or multiple
events. Among others,2 a connection may be initiated for the following reasons:
– Bootstrap: Indicates that the session was established due to first-time client
installation or a change to the ACS URL. The ACS transmits initial config-
uration data to the client.
– Periodic: Indicates that the session was established on a periodic interval,
e.g., once every 24 hours.
– Value Change: Indicates that the value of one or more monitored param-
eters has been modified.
– Connection Request: Indicates that the session is a reaction to a Connec-
tion Request from the ACS (see below).
After successful connection establishment, the client sends an Inform message
which indicates the event type(s) that triggered the connection. This allows the
ACS to learn the client’s intent and act accordingly.
Connection Requests For some of TR-069’s use cases (e.g. live diagnostics,
see Section 2.1) it is necessary for the ACS to request that the client contacts
it immediately. TR-069 defines a mandatory Connection Request mechanism to
provide this functionality.
The basic mechanism is a simple HTTP GET request from the ACS to the
TR-069 client, which runs an HTTP server for this purpose. The use of TLS
for the connection request is prohibited by the specification. To prevent denial-
of-service attacks, HTTP digest authentication is used to verify the validity of
the request. Connection requests act as a trigger only: The client will connect
back to the configured ACS URL, which cannot be modified by the connection
request.
2 For a comprehensive listing of non-vendor-specific event types, see [6, p. 65].
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A major limitation of the basic connection request mechanism is that the ACS
must be able to reach the client over HTTP. While this was negligible when
TR-069 was introduced for routers and gateways, it does not work for endpoints
which reside behind firewalls or in (IPv4) networks with network address trans-
lation. To accommodate for these devices, TR-069 Amendment 5 introduces an
XMPP-based mechanism, which supersedes the previously introduced STUN
tunneling in TR-069 Annex G [6]. In short, there are multiple methods the ACS
can use to instruct the client to contact it immediately. All mechanisms only
serve as a trigger for a client-initiated TR-069 session. The client will always
connect to the configured ACS URL for the actual TR-069 session.
While all approaches increase the attack surface, the basic connection request
mechanism is particularly interesting to attackers for its public facing web server
on the client. The connection request server listens on port 7547 by default, which
is the third most publicly exposed port in the IPv4 address space (after ports
80 and 443, before port 22) [5,12].
Connection Security If the ACS URL scheme is HTTPS, the TR-069 session
must be secured using TLS before any messages are being sent. However, the
specification imposes nonstandard restrictions on the use of TLS, which may
raise security concerns:
Hostname Matching The ACS hostname must be validated against the cer-
tificate’s Common Name, even though Common Name matching has been
deprecated since HTTPS was first introduced in 2000 in favor of Subject Al-
ternative Names [28]. TR-069 describes a simple – yet nonstandard – exact
string matching method, which is not available in major TLS libraries and
must be implemented manually to fully comply with the specification.
Root Certificate Set The client must validate the ACS certificate against one
or multiple root certificates. TR-069 does not discuss which root certificates
should be included on a device. In practice, this allows providers to either
limit trust to internal Certificate Authorities (CAs) or to rely on the internet
public key infrastructure and use a broader public CA set, such as Mozilla’s
CA bundle. The latter approach can lead to degraded security as all major
browsers enforce additional constraints on their trusted root certificates (e.g.
restricting the certificate issuance date for specific CAs), which are not re-
flected in the CA file [34]. Additionally, as public CA sets change over time,
the provider must update the CA file. TR-069 does not discuss or mandate
any form of certificate revocation.
Protocol Downgrades TR-069 states that “if the ACS does not support the
version with which the CPE establishes the connection, it might be necessary
to negotiate an earlier TLS 1.x version, or even SSL 3.0” [6, p. 41]. While
the specification states that TLS 1.2 should be used, it is very possible that
some clients will in practice be susceptible to downgrade attacks to SSL 3.0.
Client Certificates The use of client certificates to identify a client is optional.
Client certificates can be unique per device or shared between devices. In the
latter case, the specification recommends – and does not require – to addi-
tionally authenticate the client using HTTP basic or digest authentication.
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Notwithstanding these issues, TR-069’s major weakness with regard to connec-
tion confidentiality and integrity is that the use of TLS is optional. This is
particularly severe as the ACS URL can often be reconfigured by various means
(see Section 2.2), which allows an attacker to downgrade the protocol to plain-
text. If TLS is used, the use of nonstandard certificate verification methods,
missing guidance on root CA selection, proposed SSL 3.0 support, and shared
client certificates may also degrade the security of the connection to a point
where man-in-the-middle attacks are feasible.
Authentication and Initial Inform By definition, the first message of every TR-
069 session is an Inform command sent by the client (see Appendix G for an
example). The initial message identifies the device, lists the events that caused
the connection, and informs the ACS about configuration parameters, such as
the current public IP address.
If the client has not used a client certificate to authenticate itself during
the TLS handshake, TR-069 mandates that the ACS must require HTTP au-
thentication. The specification recommends to use a combination of organization
identifier and device serial number as the username and states that clients should
use unique per-device passwords. Clients must use HTTP digest authentication
for plain HTTP connections, but also must support HTTP basic authentica-
tion, which is recommended if the connection is secured using TLS. If clients
erroneously handle basic authentication challenges over unencrypted HTTP, a
man-in-the-middle attacker can exfiltrate the client’s username and password.
We discuss the security of shared credentials in Section 3.3.
Commands After the initial Inform, TR-069 defines further commands that
can be used for the communication between client and ACS. At the minimum,
a conforming ACS must support the Inform, GetRPCMethods and Transfer-
Complete commands. For clients, the requirements are more extensive. A client
must support GetRPCMethods, GetParameterNames, Get-/SetParameter-
Values, Get-/SetParameterAttributes, Add-/DeleteObject, Reboot, and
Download. Additionally, TR-069 defines optional commands as well as the ability
to specify vendor extensions. We describe commands that are interesting from a
security and privacy perspective in Appendix F.
Using the Download command, an attacker has complete control over de-
vices as new firmware can be uploaded that circumvents any potential access
restrictions. Even without a special firmware, TR-069 grants network providers
access to valuable data on their customers, ranging from detailed information
on devices connected to a router to television viewing statistics. These capabili-
ties for data collection are not an inadvertent byproduct of generic commands.
Collection of audience statistics is an explicit part of TR-135, which specifies
the TR-069 data model for set-top boxes [24]. Given the sensitivity of the data
at hand, it is reasonable to take a look at which parameters providers regularly
access. In the next section, we will discuss how TR-069 communication can be
intercepted and inspected.
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3 TR-069 Inspection
Many TR-069 devices are embedded systems which do not provide immediate
means to analyze their inner workings. Our first contribution to research is a
systematic exploration of three methods that can be used to intercept and mon-
itor TR-069 traffic: man-in-the-middle attacks, client reconfiguration, and client
emulation.
3.1 Man-In-The-Middle Attacks
When locked-down devices do not provide any means for inspection, researchers
can resort to the analysis of network traffic. The analyst controls a machine
between the TR-069 client and the ACS, allowing him to observe all commu-
nication. For unencrypted TR-069 sessions, this setup is sufficient to read and
modify all commands and their responses. If the connection is protected with
TLS, an analyst can mount a man-in-the-middle attack against the client to
achieve the same end, e.g. by using mitmproxy [9]. While this method relies
on the availability of trusted certificate keys or the presence of security vulner-
abilities on the client, previous research has shown that this is often the case
for non-browser TLS implementations (see Section 7). For TR-069 clients in
particular, we have outlined multiple potential weaknesses in Section 2.2.
Next, we study the use of TLS by service providers before we discuss the
applicability of traffic interception on the physical layer for a specific class of
TR-069 devices, namely internet gateways.
Use of TLS by Service Providers Recall from Section 2.2 that TLS is op-
tional for TR-069. Hence, it is interesting to examine how many providers follow
the recommendation to use TLS [6, p. 40] in practice. In search of a data source,
we observed that several aftermarket routers sold in Europe3 prompt users for
their provider’s name during setup and use this information to configure ba-
sic connection parameters of the device, including its TR-069 settings. These
settings are also contained in the firmware update packages that many router
manufacturers make available on the internet. We systematically downloaded
current and outdated firmware update packages released between 2016 and 2018
for various DSL, cable, and fiber modems as well as routers, extracted the file
systems, and searched them for TR-069 credentials. However, as there is sub-
stantial overlap between the providers supported by aftermarket routers, we are
confident that we have a comprehensive coverage of providers in the relevant
markets.
The results of this analysis are shown in Figure 3. Overall, we obtained 471
TR-069 configurations representing 60 internet service providers. Our sample
3 Germany, for example, passed a law establishing freedom of choice for routers in
November 2015 [15]. Therefore, Germany has a strong ecosystem of aftermarket
routers which are user-friendly to set up. The situation in other European countries
is similar.
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Fig. 3: TR-069 Provider Configurations
Configuration Firmware Verification
Country Provider NOHC TLS VER PIN CRT 2016 2017 2018 PUB TOR MAIL
Austria A1 • • • • • • • •
IKB • • •
UPC • • • • •
highspeed.vol.at • • • •
Belgium BILLI • • •
Dommel • • • •
EDPNET • • • • • •
Join Experience • • • • • •
TV Vlaanderen • • • • •
Telesat • • • • •
Croatia H1 Telekom • •
Cyprus Cyta Internet Home • • • •
MTN • • •
Denmark Telenor • • • • •
Estonia Elion • • • • •
Finland ANVIA • • • •
Germany 1&1 • • • • • • • •
BayernDSL • • • • • •
Be-Converged • • • • •
EWE (ALL-IP) • • • • •
EWE (DSL) • • • • •
GMX • • • • • • • •
Kabel Deutschland • • •
KielNET • • • • • • •
M-net • • • • • • • •
NetAachen • • • •
NetCologne • • • •
QUiX • • • • • •
Telekom • • • • • •
Vodafone (DSL) • • • • • • • •
Vodafone (LTE) • • • • • • •
WOBCOM • • • • • •
htp (DSL) • • • • • • •
htp (Fiber) • • • • • •
inexio • • • • • •
o2 • • • • • •
osnatel (ALL-IP) • • • • •
osnatel (DSL) • • • • •
swb AG (ALL-IP) • • • • •
swb AG (DSL) • • • • •
symbox • • • • • •
Italy EOLO • •
Infostrada • • • •
Lineacom • • •
Planetel • • • •
Raiffeisen • • • •
Telecom Italia • • • • • • • •
Wind Business • • • •
mc-link • • • •
Luxembourg Join Experience • • • • • • •
Luxembourg Online • • • • • •
Orange Luxembourg • • • • • •
Post Luxembourg • • • •
Tango • • • •
Visual Online • • • • •
Netherlands EDPNET • • • • • •
Fiber Nederland • • • •
Kliksafe (DSL) • • • •
Kliksafe (Fiber) • • • •
Scarlet / Stipte • • • • •
Solcon • • •
XS4ALL • • • • • •
New Zealand 2degrees • • • • • •
Poland Plast-Com • • • •
Spain VozTelecom • • • • • •
Switzerland Sunrise • • • •
# Total 60 22 31 16 2 2 37 50 60 11 4 60
NOHC: Firmware does not contain hardcoded credentials; TLS: Client should use TLS; VER: Client
should verify server certificate; PIN: The number of trusted root certificates is reduced; CRT: Use of
a (shared) client certificate; 2016-2018: Configuration has been found in firmware images released in
the respective year; PUB: The ACS is reachable from the public internet; TOR: The ACS is reachable
from selected Tor exit nodes; MAIL: Provider has been informed of results and did not rebut findings.
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set likely over-represents European countries (Germany, in particular) as well as
larger service providers that are more likely to be included in a router’s setup
assistant. Strikingly, we found that almost half of the providers do not use TLS
at all (29 of 60). Among those who use TLS, almost half do not validate server
certificates (15 of 31). Two providers limit the number of trusted CAs to their
own authority, whereas all other providers trust the default set of CAs installed
on the respective device. Two other providers mandate the use of TLS client
certificates. However, they use a shared certificate for all devices, the private key
of which can be extracted from the firmware in both cases. While larger providers
in our data set seem to use TLS more prudently, we observe that providers often
do not adequately protect TR-069 sessions against man-in-the-middle attacks.
We used multiple methods to verify the validity of the provider configurations
we found. First, we attempted to establish a TCP connection with all ACSes
in our data set to verify their presence. This confirmed the existence of only
11 configuration servers, as many providers presumably have firewall rules in
place to deny access from foreign networks. Second, we used the Tor anonymity
network to scan for ACSes from within other providers’ networks. Even though
the vast majority of Tor exit nodes is not located in residential IP space, this
confirmed four additional servers. We presume that we would be able to confirm
substantially more ACSes by using “residential proxy services”. We did not use
these proxies as they are – very similar to DDoS booter services – universally
run by criminals [40]. Finally, we informed each provider of our findings and
provided them with the opportunity to correct invalid or outdated results in a
responsible disclosure process (see Appendix A).
Another option to find additional ACSes would have been a scan of the entire
IPv4 address space for public instances. As port 7547 is used by both TR-069
clients and configuration servers, we would have needed to interact with these
systems to determine their nature. We have refrained from doing this because
of the unacceptably high risk of interfering with fragile TR-069 systems in the
wild. For example, Weinmann’s analysis of an alleged TR-064/069 vulnerability
in 900k routers demonstrated that just probing port 7547 in a specific way can
result in an effective DoS attack against routers and large-scale outages [43].
Man-In-The-Middle Attacks on Internet Gateways A major share of
all TR-069 clients are internet gateways. Launching a man-in-the-middle attack
against these devices on customer premises can be tricky because it requires
– depending on the device type – the interception of copper telephone lines,
coaxial cable, or optical fiber. In contrast to Ethernet connections, which are
easily intercepted with off-the-shelf hardware, sniffing is not straightforward in
these cases. Cable internet, for example, operates on a shared medium, therefore
providers often encrypt the traffic between the cable modem and their cable ter-
mination system. Although previous research has shown that cable encryption is
often weak [2,29], without doubt such attacks remain significantly more complex
than with Ethernet; not to mention the ethical and legal concerns related to
eavesdropping on a shared medium. As a workaround, gateways with integrated
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routers can often be configured to disable the modem and treat a regular LAN
port as their (internet) WAN port instead. In this case, the router can be moved
into an existing network where it can be monitored. Nonetheless, a “classical”
interception of internet gateways remains difficult to implement in general. An
oftentimes easier approach is the use of client reconfiguration, which we will
discuss in the next section.
3.2 Client Reconfiguration
When analyzing router firmwares for TR-069 configurations, we found that many
devices provide means to modify their TR-069 settings. This makes it possible to
perform a considerably easier man-in-the-middle attack. Instead of intercepting
the connection between gateway and ACS, we place a machine in the local net-
work that acts as a reverse proxy to the original ACS. We then reconfigure the
gateway to use this machine as its ACS. In other words, we instruct the gateway
to use http://acs.example.local/ as its ACS, where acs.example.local is
our local proxy that forwards all requests to the provider’s ACS. This has a
number of advantages:
1. For modems, this removes the requirement to perform a man-in-the-middle
attack on copper telephone lines, coaxial cable, or optical fiber. Instead,
interception can be done with off-the-shelf Ethernet devices.
2. By reconfiguring the ACS URL, one can downgrade the protocol between
gateway and interception device to plain HTTP, which makes it possible to
intercept connections otherwise protected by TLS (see Section 2.2).
3. In contrast to the network setup described in Section 3.1, the inspection
devices only needs to forward TR-069 communication. As all other network
traffic is unaffected, the proxy device needs considerably fewer resources.
However, client reconfiguration is not free of pitfalls. The ACS may use a TR-069
session to update the server URL, which would override the custom redirection
and bypass the proxy. In contrast to a classical man-in-the-middle attack, the
local proxy device has limited means to detect and correct this. While regu-
lar TR-069 SetParameterValues commands can be manipulated on-the-fly, the
ACS URL may also be reset by firmware updates. This makes long-term moni-
toring of reconfigured devices an ongoing challenge.
TR-069 defines multiple mechanisms to configure the ACS URL (see Sec-
tion 2.2). Devices differ widely in what they support. For example, on some
TP-Link routers, we were able to configure the ACS URL via the router’s web
interface. For AVM4 routers, we found that TR-069 can be configured via TR-
064 (the configuration interface available from LAN), or by restoring a forged
configuration file. In contrast, we did not find means to reconfigure a Cisco cable
modem without intercepting communication on the coaxial cable first. But we
were able to reconfigure a Cisco IP phone via DHCP.
4 In 2013, AVM’s Fritz!Box series had an estimated market share of 68% in Germany
and 18% in Europe [18].
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3.3 Emulated Clients
When observing the traffic of a given TR-069 client is impractical, another op-
tion is to completely emulate a TR-069 device. This is particularly useful to
repeatedly analyze the handling of selected events such as device provisioning.
In contrast to the previously described interception techniques, the major
challenge with emulated clients is not intercepting connections, but obtaining
valid credentials to communicate with the configuration server. In this section,
we discuss how clients can authenticate themselves to existing configuration
servers to establish TR-069 sessions. We describe our emulated honeyclient later
on in Section 4.
To establish a TR-069 session, a client generally needs two pieces of infor-
mation: the ACS URL and valid credentials for authentication. The difficulty of
obtaining these depends on provider and device. If both device manufacturer and
provider put a high emphasis on protecting their TR-069 communication against
external observers, analysts need to extract credentials by manually reverse-
engineering specific devices. However, we find that the use of shared credentials
is prevalent in practice. When we analyzed the use of TLS by service providers in
Section 3.1, 38 of 60 providers had hardcoded authentication credentials in their
TR-069 configuration. Next we discuss how this impacts connection security.
Shared Authentication Credentials Counter-intuitively, hardcoded TR-069 cre-
dentials do not necessarily imply a vulnerability. If TR-069 is used for monitoring
purposes only and not for the provisioning of, for instance, VoIP credentials, the
secure identification of individual devices is less of a concern. Also, a provider
may only use hardcoded credentials to provide an initial generic configuration
and then update the credentials stored on the device with unique ones using
the SetParameterValues command. The TR-069 specification discourages hard-
coded credentials, but does not prohibit them. When sharing credentials between
devices, providers need to resort to alternative means of identifying individual
customers. There are various attributes a provider can use for this purpose:
1. The client’s IP address as seen by the server.
2. The client’s IP address as reported in the initial Inform command.5
3. The device’s serial number as reported in the initial Inform command.
4. The router’s MAC address, which can be obtained with a
GetParameterValues command.
5. User input collected in a custom authentication dialog.
We briefly discuss each option’s security properties. For the first four options, we
assume that the provider has reliable means to map IP addresses, serial numbers,
or MAC addresses to customers.
Option 1 has the major issue that any device in a customer’s network can
obtain the customer’s TR-069 configuration. For example, clients in a public
wireless network (e.g. in cafés) could obtain the owner’s VoIP credentials and
commit phone fraud.
5 Without taking security concerns into account, a provider may prefer this over op-
tion 1 because it works if proxies in the provider’s network mask the client’s IP.
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Options 2–4 have a common problem in that they rely on information which is
easily spoofable and should not be considered secret. The IP space of an internet
service provider is public knowledge and MAC addresses or serial numbers cannot
be assumed to be random nor secret. For example, we found that the serial
number of an AVM router can be read by any client in its network without
authentication.
Option 5 is the most secure one, but complex to implement correctly. The
TR-069 specification does not provide any guidance on possible authentication
methods. Moreover, many providers are reluctant to use this option as it conflicts
with the stated goal of “Zero-Touch” configuration (cf. Section 2.1).
In summary, TR-069 client authentication is a hard problem for service
providers in practice. The use of hardcoded credentials comes with unique se-
curity challenges, yet the absence of hardcoded TR-069 credentials does not
necessarily imply that the provider is using different or better means to identify
customers. Previous work has indicated that this problem is not of theoretical
nature [27]. The prevalence of hardcoded credentials in practice makes it quite
easy to set up emulated clients in many networks.
3.4 Comparison of Inspection Methods
Man-in-the-middle attacks, client reconfiguration, or emulated clients are suf-
ficient to inspect many TR-069 deployments in practice. However, none of the
methods is guaranteed to succeed with a specific client and configuration server.
As a last resort, interception may require manual reverse-engineering of indi-
vidual devices. For researchers and practitioners interested in the analysis of
TR-069, we make the following recommendations:
1. For all devices that allow easy network interception, the most ef-
fective approach is to attempt a classic man-in-the-middle attack first. If
unsuccessful, reconfiguration via DHCP can be tried next. At the very least,
this approach provides researchers with the ACS address, which can then po-
tentially be matched with TR-069 credentials extracted from other devices.
2. For modems where interception is difficult or man-in-the-middle
attacks fail, we propose to attempt a device reconfiguration via web inter-
face, TR-064, DHCP, or settings files (in this order). While our small sample
set of devices produced by three different manufacturers does not allow for
general conclusions, we were quite successful in downgrading TR-069 to plain
HTTP and rerouting connections.
3. For an interactive approach to TR-069 monitoring, emulated clients
can be used to observe how an ACS reacts to simulated device events. This is
particularly useful to test firmware upgrade behavior, device authentication,
and provisioning procedures. The ease of deployment makes emulated clients
attractive for large-scale studies.
In summary, TR-069 inspection is very feasible in practice, although we are not
aware of a “silver bullet”. Setting up devices for inspection is a highly manual
process.
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4 TR-069 Honeyclient
While TR-069 inspection by man-in-the-middle attack or client reconfiguration
(cf. Sections 3.1 and 3.2) can be implemented with standard tools, at the time
of writing we are unaware of any existing software that can readily emulate TR-
069 clients (cf. Section 3.3). Here we introduce an open-source honeyclient we
developed to solve this problem. Our honeyclient emulates TR-069 devices and
can be used to watch configuration servers and observe their response to certain
events. This allows us to assess how different devices are bootstrapped, which
parameters a provider accesses, or how fast security updates are rolled out.
The design of the honeyclient is based on three central requirements: full
coverage of the TR-069 protocol, usability for the target audience of proficient
security analysts, and the capability to perform deliberate protocol violations.
We discuss the implementation of these requirements in Appendix B. For an
initial exploration, we provide an interactive command line interface that can
be used to issue TR-069 commands and observe the provider’s response. Alter-
natively, the honeyclient can be instrumented in Python. Next, we describe the
results of using our honeyclient for the automated security testing.
4.1 Analysis of Open-Source TR-069 Servers
To demonstrate that our client is effective at uncovering security vulnerabilities,
we have used its scripting capabilities to develop an automated test suite for
configuration servers, which we instantiated in a controlled network environment.
Our targets are GenieACS [1], the only open-source configuration server in active
development, and OpenACS [41]. The latter is still relevant as we found multiple
providers with an ACS URL indicating that they likely run OpenACS.
Even though we only performed very limited automated black-box tests with
our honeyclient, we found security vulnerabilities in both tested open-source con-
figuration servers. Our findings are described in Appendix C. While we note that
the vulnerabilities are specific to GenieACS and OpenACS, empirical research
has shown that open-source and closed-source software often do not significantly
differ with regard to the severity of vulnerabilities [3,31]. We suspect that the use
of serial numbers for customer identification might be a widespread issue with
configuration servers as the TR-069 specification does not provide any guidance
on client authentication. This is critical as it allows attackers to e.g. obtain other
user’s VoIP credentials for phone fraud [30].
5 TR-069 Infrastructure Monitoring
When looking at TR-069 from a security and privacy standpoint, it is interesting
to not only analyze a single client, ACS implementation, or provider in isolation,
but to compare how different providers and clients behave over time and in reac-
tion to specific events. For example, how fast are different providers rolling our
An Inspection and Monitoring Toolkit for TR-069 15
Collector
Internet
Sensor
ACS
End-User
Premises
Fig. 4: Data collection setup
security updates? How many providers use TR-069 not only for remote manage-
ment, but also to obtain information on sensitive data such as television viewing
statistics? How is TR-069 used in countries with restricted freedoms to imple-
ment censorship or surveillance? Monitoring TR-069 infrastructure at a larger
scale provides better information on the security and privacy aspects of TR-
069 in practice. In this section, we propose how our toolkit can be turned in
an infrastructure for monitoring a larger number of TR-069 deployments over
longer periods of time. For brevity, we describe the implementation of our indi-
vidual monitoring sensors based on inexpensive mini routers in Appendix D and
our virtual test environment that makes TR-069 more accessible to researchers
in Appendix E. Based on our monitoring sensors, we outline the challenges of
large-scale TR-069 monitoring and report measurements of twelve months of
real-world TR-069 traffic.
5.1 Distributed Monitoring System
Compared to internet monitoring efforts such as Censys [12], collecting data
on the TR-069 infrastructure is more challenging because many configuration
servers are not reachable from the public internet. To support this with data:
among server addresses we obtained in the analysis of Section 3.1, we found
that 49 out of 60 hosts were shielded off the internet, presumably to reduce the
attack surface of the ACS (see Figure 3). Therefore, a monitoring infrastructure
must be distributed with sensors located in each provider’s network. Addition-
ally, the installation of sensors requires some expertise and manual configuration:
for each deployment, either a suitable inspection method or valid authentication
credentials for a honeyclient need to be obtained. For TR-069, this often involves
reverse-engineering individual devices and thus limits the scalability of our ap-
proach to TR-069 monitoring. However, we believe that a limited network of
sensors is still useful to observe basic TR-069 operations in practice.
To collect data from multiple sensors, we have opted for a simple centralized
logging infrastructure. Sensors report all TR-069 activity to a dedicated log
collector via HTTPS (see Figure 4). Data is redacted before transmission (cf.
Appendix A) and then stored on the collector.
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5.2 Real-World Measurement Study
To evaluate our monitoring system, we have conducted a twelve month study
where we continuously monitored TR-069 traffic of ten households in Western
Europe. Study participants were recruited through the first authors’ personal
contacts and informed what kind of data will be collected. For each participant,
we determined a suitable inspection method for the respective router and config-
ured a monitoring sensor on-site. In total, our measurements cover nine distinct
device models and five internet service providers (cable and DSL) starting in
March 2018. Our main findings are as follows:
Over the course of our study, three device models received updates from the
manufacturer. However, we did not observe any provider deploying these updates
to our participants’ devices via TR-069. Two devices were manually patched by
their owners four and twenty days after firmware release respectively, and one
device remains unpatched for ten months as of today (December 2019). A fourth
device entered our study in an unpatched state and still remains so. While TR-
069 could improve end user security by providing timely firmware updates, we
found that providers are not doing their homework as we couldn’t observe any
evidence of this in practice.
In more positive news, we did not find any “smoking gun” indicating severe
privacy violations by service providers. Next to the periodic Inform messages
sent by clients, providers sent commands that can all be reasonably linked to
regular maintenance work. For example, two providers updated the ACS URL
to a new configuration server while a third provider repeatedly queried DSL
connection quality parameters for a period of two days to presumably debug
connectivity issues. While our findings show no evidence of widespread privacy
violations, providers could still target particularly interesting customers individ-
ually. Overall, our study validates that the distributed monitoring system works
reliably for long-term TR-069 monitoring.
6 Discussion
As the first contribution of this paper, we have discussed man-in-the-middle at-
tacks, client reconfiguration and emulated clients as three methods to inspect
TR-069 traffic. Our analysis of provider configurations has shown that providers
often neglect to follow the security recommendations made in the TR-069 spec-
ification. We hypothesize that this is happening because plain HTTP is still
marginally cheaper and simpler to implement while sniffing or man-in-the-middle
attacks are not perceived as realistic threats. All devices we analyzed would have
supported TLS. From our point of view, allowing plain HTTP is a design mistake
of the TR-069 specification which opens the door to a whole class of attacks.
We do want to point out that – notwithstanding our previous point – in-
terception and monitoring of internet gateways can still be difficult to establish
when devices are resistant to reconfiguration. There are two reasons why we
believe that this is not as much of an issue as one may think: First, TR-069 has
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moved from being used by internet gateways only to supporting a whole range
of devices such as set-top boxes and VoIP phones, which all can be intercepted
more easily on Ethernet. Second, the use of emulated clients often is an effective
alternative to monitoring real devices.
The second contribution of this paper is an open-source TR-069 honeyclient
that can be used to assess TR-069 configuration servers from a security and
privacy point of view. As analysts can emulate arbitrary events, we found that
it is often more effective to use a honeyclient when analyzing a configuration
server than to monitor a real device. We further believe that our client is not
only effective at monitoring, but also at offensive security research, as evidenced
by the vulnerabilities we found in OpenACS and GenieACS using automated
black-box testing. The security of configuration servers is a promising avenue for
future research.
With regard to practical TR-069 security, our most important finding is the
widespread use of hardcoded credentials. Both GenieACS and OpenACS use the
device serial number as the primary means of identification, and the prevalence
of hardcoded credentials in provider configurations suggests that this is also the
case for a variety of commercial configuration servers. As we discussed in Section
3.3, neither the use of IP address-based nor serial number-based authentication
can be considered secure. At the same time, the TR-069 specification does not
provide any guidance on how clients should be identified. When clients are not
authenticated securely, an attacker can impersonate other users to obtain their
TR-069 configuration, which includes for example VoIP credentials.
As the third contribution of this paper, we have developed a monitoring
sensor and a centralized log collector to monitor TR-069 deployments in practice.
We have demonstrated that our sensor can be run on inexpensive routers, but
we did not perform a rigorous evaluation of possible hardware alternatives. As
our sensor runs on OpenWrt, we believe that it can be easily adapted to work on
other hardware platforms. A major concern in the development was the privacy
of study participants (see Appendix A). The sensitive nature of TR-069 traffic
makes it difficult to conduct analyses that are both comprehensive and privacy-
preserving. At the very least, the inner workings of our platform are – down to
the operating system – open-source software and available for inspection.
An interesting avenue for future work is TR-069 monitoring at high-value
endpoints that may be targeted with custom configurations. Here we see two
main challenges that need to be addressed in future research. First, our sensor
deployment currently has high setup costs. Sensors must be installed on cus-
tomers’ premises, installation is a relatively manual process, and user privacy
must be considered appropriately. Second, when asking volunteers to set up sen-
sors and contribute data, the authenticity of our results is at stake as we cannot
verify the legitimacy of logs with our current architecture. Nonetheless, we be-
lieve that even relatively small sensor deployments can yield interesting insights
in practice (see Section 5.2). With the growing adoption of TR-069 for devices
other than internet gateways, monitoring TR-069 becomes gradually more im-
portant and easier to accomplish at the same time.
18 M. Hils, R. Böhme
7 Related Work
Despite the widespread use of TR-069, there is very little public information
about the protocol’s security and privacy implications. In this section, we first
review works on TR-069 security and then discuss publications on man-in-the-
middle attacks and honeypots that inspired our work.
TR-069 Security We are not aware of any academic publications on TR-069
security. Therefore, we deem it also valuable to point to “grey” literature.
One team of security researchers has focused its attention on specific im-
plementation vulnerabilities in TR-069 clients and configuration servers. Most
notably, Tal presented a talk on exploiting TR-069 configuration servers at Def-
con 22 [35] in 2014. He disclosed vulnerabilities in multiple configuration servers
and gained control over 500,000 managed devices in one particular instance.
The respective security advisories are still undisclosed as of December 2019. In a
follow-up talk, Tal and Oppenheim demonstrated the “Misfortune Cookie” vul-
nerability in the RomPager TR-069 connection request server, which is embed-
ded in at least 12 million residential gateways manufactured by ASUS, D-Link,
Edimax, Huawei, TP-Link, ZTE, ZyXEL, and others they found exposed to the
internet [37]. While RomPager developer AllegroSoft issued a version that fixes
the vulnerability in 2005, devices today (2019) still ship with the vulnerable ver-
sion. This shows that the patch propagation cycle is incredibly slow (sometimes
non-existent) for these types of devices [36].
In January 2016, RedTeam Pentesting published an information disclosure
vulnerability in o2/Telefonica Germany’s configuration server [27]. QA Cafe, a
US-based software company specialized in testing broadband gateways, pub-
lishes TR-069 security best practices for service providers [26]. We also note
Ömer Erdem’s master thesis on HoneyThing, a honeypot that emulates three
known vulnerabilities in connection request servers [13]. Vetterl and Clayton use
firmware images to emulate CPE/IoT devices and run them as honeypots [42].
Man-In-The-Middle Attacks on TLS Man-in-the-middle attacks are a common
technique to learn or modify communication contents that are otherwise pro-
tected using Transport Layer Security (TLS) [7]. Previous research has shown
that non-browser TLS implementations often implement certificate verification
incorrectly and are subject to such attacks [14,16]. For a comprehensive overview
of past TLS security issues, we refer to Clark and Van Oorschot [8].
Honeyclients A honeypot is “a security resource whose value lies in being probed,
attacked, or compromised” [33]. One subgroup of honeypots are honeyclients,
which mimic the behavior of a network client that actively initiates requests to
servers aiming to be attacked [32]. The development of our TR-069 honeyclient
was largely inspired by Nazario’s PhoneyC, a honeyclient that emulates a web
browser to enable the study of malicious websites [21]. Similar to PhoneyC, our
honeyclient emulates a TR-069 device and connects to configuration servers to
get attacked. In contrast to most existing honeypots, the value of our honeyclient
lies not only in the detection of attacks, but also in the logging of events that
demonstrate privacy infringements or other unwanted actions by providers.
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8 Conclusion
This paper takes a look at the security and privacy aspects of the TR-069 remote
management protocol. Although the protocol is used in nearly a billion devices,
our work represents (to the best of our knowledge) the first academic publication
on the topic.
To facilitate further research, we have first discussed the protocol from a se-
curity perspective and presented three methods researchers can use to analyze
the TR-069 communication of their devices. None of the approaches is guaran-
teed to succeed with a specific client or configuration server, but we have shown
that man-in-the-middle attacks, client reconfiguration and the use of emulated
clients can be used to inspect the majority of networks in practice. To enable
analyses that go beyond the monitoring of existing devices, we contribute an
open-source honeyclient implementation that can be used to assess configura-
tion servers. Using our client, we were able to obtain information on firmware
updates, VoIP credentials, and data access patterns by providers in practice.
While its primary field of use lies in the monitoring of configuration servers,
our honeyclient can also be utilized by providers to debug and stress-test their
configuration servers, as well as researchers who can instrument it for offensive
security research. We have built an automated test suite on top of our client to
demonstrate weaknesses in OpenACS and GenieACS, two open-source configu-
ration servers. The vulnerabilities we found provide initial evidence that client
authentication could be a systemic issue in the TR-069 landscape. Our findings
support the general assertion by Tal and Oppenheim that TR-069 infrastructure
is most often inadequately secured [37].
To facilitate the monitoring of providers for privacy infringements and other
unwanted behavior conducted over TR-069, we have developed a monitoring
sensor based on mitmproxy. Compared to internet-wide scanning studies, the
manual work required to deploy individual sensors is a fundamental limitation
for large-scale TR-069 measurements. We release both our honeyclient and the
sensor software as open source under the MIT license6.
We have used our monitoring system to conduct real-world measurements
of TR-069 traffic for twelve months. While we did not observe any privacy vi-
olations by providers, we also found no evidence of providers using TR-069 to
push firmware updates released by vendors during our measurement period. The
purported security benefits of TR-069 are not realized.
Looking ahead, we hope that our work lays the foundation for more security
research on TR-069. We limited our real-world measurements to routers as the
most popular TR-069 device type, but we expect research on for example set-top
boxes to yield interesting data on potential privacy infringements by providers.
Furthermore, we encourage researchers to use our honeyclient for the assessment
of TR-069 configuration servers. As these systems effectively have remote exe-
cution privileges on all connected devices, they represent high-value targets that
would benefit from more throughout security analyses in practice.
6 https://github.com/mhils/tr069
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A Ethical Considerations and Privacy Measures
For the research of this paper, we collected providers’ TR-069 credentials and
deployed sensors to monitor our study subjects’ TR-069 communication. This
makes it inherently challenging yet critically important to execute our research
ethically. While our host institution has processes in place, they do not apply
to our research. Researchers are advised to act responsibly in in compliance
with data protection laws; we chose to follow the Menlo Report [10] and, when
necessary, consulted legal experts.
TR-069 Provider Configurations While we did not test providers’ ACS deploy-
ments for specific security vulnerabilites, we have notified all providers for which
we obtained TR-069 configurations (see Section 3.1) about our findings as the
publication of our results may point criminals to potential opportunities for
abuse. Providers were made aware of our upcoming publication and were pro-
vided with an anonymized version of Figure 3 in which their own identity was
revealed to them. As many providers did not provide security contact email ad-
dresses, all notifications were sent by postal mail and providers were given 60
days to comment. We received positive replies from multiple providers acknowl-
edging that this is an industry-wide issue. No providers objected to publication
or debated our results. We believe that publishing data on the current security
level of the TR-069 ecosystem is necessary to incentivize improvements. While
useful for future research, we refrain from publishing any of the collected ACS
credentials as they could be easily abused.
Real-World Measurement Study A key challenge with our measurement study
was to retain user privacy while collecting relevant data. To protect study partic-
ipants’ data, we have implemented the following measures. All study participants
were specifically selected to have a background in Computer Science. They were
then informed on how TR-069 works, and what kind of data we were about to
collect. They were allowed to withdraw from our study at any point. At the
beginning of the study, participants were provided with a sensor device which
recorded all TR-069 commands locally and only sent the command names and,
in the case of Inform commands, the causing event type, to the collector. For the
locally recorded logs, any detected credentials were replaced with placeholders
before data was written to disk.
By default, the authors had no access to the sensor devices after permanently
handing them over to study participants. If command names pointed to inter-
esting behavior, study participants were asked to inspect the data in the web
interface (which is why we required a technical background) and, if they were
comfortable sharing it, flip a hardware switch on the sensor device to temporar-
ily start an SSH server the authors could connect to. By using a hardware switch
and an indicator light, study participants were at all times able to control access
to the sensor and their data. At the end of our study, participants were provided
with instructions on how they can delete all collected data and repurpose the
devices.
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B Honeyclient Implementation
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Fig. 5: State machine of conforming TR-069 sessions.
The design of the honeyclient is based on three central requirements: full coverage
of the TR-069 protocol, usability for the target audience of proficient security
analysts, and the capability to perform deliberate protocol violations. In the
following, we describe how these criteria are reflected in our implementation.
Full Protocol Coverage To communicate with all types of configuration servers,
our implementation supports all authentication methods described in the TR-
069 specification (HTTP basic authentication, HTTP digest authentication, and
TLS client certificates), and allows to modify all relevant attributes of the ini-
tial Inform message (see Section 3.3). Our honeyclient can emulate arbitrary
devices, whose configuration can be automatically parsed from intercepted net-
work traffic. It implements every command we have observed in practice. In
addition, users can process custom messages, such as vendor extensions. In or-
der to support provider-initiated TR-069 sessions, the honeyclient includes a
server component that handles incoming connection requests. Note that the full
protocol coverage helps to prevent simple fingerprinting, but stealthiness was not
a design goal. Therefore, we cannot fully rule out that an ACS can detect that it
is talking to our honeyclient instead of the expected device, e.g., by measuring
client response times.
Usability To facilitate uptake by other researchers, usability is an explicit design
goal of our honeyclient. This influences our implementation as follows: first,
we have opted to write the honeyclient in Python 3, a high-level programming
language many security practitioners are familiar with. The Python package
has minimal dependencies and can easily be deployed on inexpensive embedded
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devices. Second, we provide an interactive command line interface that can be
used to get familiar with our honeyclient. For an initial exploration, researchers
can issue TR-069 commands and observe the provider’s response, as well as react
to out-of-band connection requests. For automated (long-term) monitoring of
configuration servers, the client can then be instrumented using Python scripts.
To make the analysis of configuration servers more efficient, the honeyclient can
automatically process all server commands we have observed in practice.
Protocol Violations Conforming TR-069 clients exactly implement the state ma-
chine for TR-069 sessions as shown in Figure 5. The honeyclient can be used to
deliberately violate a configuration server’s expectations of state transitions. For
example, the client can send conflicting commands over the same connection,
skip state transitions (e.g. the initial Inform message), or replay a previously
sent message. This makes it possible to uncover logic errors, missing replay pro-
tection, and other issues in the configuration server. It is also possible to craft
malformed SOAP messages, either to mirror bugs in actual devices (of which we
encountered several), or probe systems for XML parsing vulnerabilities.
C Analysis of Open-Source TR-069 Servers
Using only automated black-box tests, our honeyclient detected the following
vulnerabilities in GenieACS and OpenACS:7
1. GenieACS does not implement HTTP authentication for TR-069 sessions.
Providers running GenieACS must rely on alternative means to identify
users, which are often not implemented securely (see Section 3.3).
2. GenieACS reveals the device configurations of other users when presented
with a spoofed serial number in the initial Inform command. An attacker can
access arbitrary customer configurations (including e.g. VoIP credentials) by
iterating over candidate serial numbers.
3. GenieACS is vulnerable to XML External Entity (XXE) attacks, enabling
local file disclosure.
4. GenieACS permits any client command after an initial Inform. Our honey-
client could successfully issue different Inform commands in a single session,
allowing us to confuse the server-side state belonging to different devices.
5. When issuing connection requests, GenieACS accepts a HTTP basic au-
thentication challenge from our honeyclient. This violates the TR-069 spec-
ification, which mandates digest authentication (see Section 2.2). As basic
authentication provides no replay protection, devices and providers are sus-
ceptible to denial-of-service attacks.
6. OpenACS does not invalidate digest authentication nonces, which permits
replay attacks.
7. Like GenieACS, OpenACS accepts any command at any point during a ses-
sion, making it susceptible to attacks involving state confusion.
7 The authors are committed to responsible disclosure. The details of potential weak-
nesses and discovered vulnerabilities were shared with the maintainers, providers,
and the relevant CERTs.
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D Sensor Implementation
We have developed a monitoring sensor that can be used to intercept and record
TR-069 sessions. The sensor records all HTTP messages and connection meta-
data (e.g. server certificates) in an append-only transaction log, which can be
displayed to the user and exported for analysis. On a technical level, our sen-
sor is implemented as a series of independent add-ons for mitmproxy [9], an
open-source man-in-the-middle proxy. In addition to the add-ons used for data
processing, we have modified mitmproxy’s web interface to better visualize TR-
069 sessions.
The overarching requirement for our sensor design was to facilitate deploy-
ment on a wide user base. From this we derive three design criteria: independence
of the inspection method, privacy, and inexpensive sensor hardware. In the fol-
lowing, we describe how these criteria are reflected in our implementation.
Independence of Inspection Method It is often attractive to combine the inspec-
tion methods introduced in Section 3 in a single analysis. For example, when
using honeyclients for their ease of set up, it is useful to validate findings by
comparing the traffic to traffic generated by real devices. Our sensor can perform
transparent man-in-the-middle attacks, act as a reverse proxy for reconfigured
clients, or operate with emulated devices, such as our honeyclient. When the sen-
sor is configured as a reverse proxy, it automatically rewrites commands that read
or write reconfigured parameters. For example, when a SetParameterValues
command is issued to update the ACS URL on the client, the sensor will modify
the message to retain the device reconfiguration and update its internal for-
warding address instead. While this reconfiguration protection can in principle
be sidestepped with firmware updates (see Section 3.2), the sensor would still
record the evasion attempt.
Privacy A key challenge with TR-069 sensors is retaining user privacy and se-
curity while collecting relevant data. From a security perspective, TR-069 ses-
sions occasionally contain secrets such as VoIP credentials, which should not
be included in the sensor’s logs. From a privacy perspective, TR-069 sessions
regularly contain personally identifiable information as well as information that
may reveals user attitudes and behaviors. We have adopted Langheinrich’s [19]
guidelines to handle the challenges in the design phase:
1. Notice, Choice, and Consent: As the immediate purpose of our sensor is
data collection, we allege that users understand that they are being sensed
when they are physically installed in their homes. However, we do not expect
them to initially understand what kind of data is transmitted over TR-069.
As such, all data is recorded on the device only and can be reviewed before
being shared with researchers. While this view on the data is arguably very
technical, we presume that this is in the interest of our (likewise technical)
audience. Second, a simple physical switch on the sensor is used for access
control so that users can revoke consent to sharing their data at any time.
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We include this option as previous research has shown that privacy controls
are exercised in particular if they are easy to understand [20].
2. Anonymity and Pseudonymity: For many research questions regarding
TR-069, it is hard to provide anonymity to study subjects. For example, it
is fundamentally difficult to not collect personally identifiable information
when assessing the extent of privacy infringements by providers. For large-
scale monitoring, we provide users with the option to stay anonymous within
a study by reducing message contents to command names, thereby removing
all information about the state of the client or connected devices.
3. Collection and Use Limitation: TR-069 configuration servers transmit
a variety of credentials for e.g. VoIP accounts or streaming services. This
makes the contents of TR-069 sessions an attractive target for criminals.
To protect users, the sensor will replace credentials with placeholder values
before logging them to persistent storage. This provides an analyst with a
comprehensive view on TR-069 sessions without potentially compromising
the security of transmitted account credentials.
For researchers who intend to design their own methods for conducting privacy-
preserving studies on TR-069, we like to point out that we found the reliable
redaction of sensitive message contents to be unexpectedly difficult. Two de-
vices we assessed produced XML that was malformed to the point where we
were unable to parse it consistently with multiple XML parsers, e.g. because of
unescaped control characters or attribute definitions in closing tags.
Sensor Hardware For monitoring TR-069 deployments over longer periods of
time, it is desirable to run the sensor on inexpensive, always-on devices. As
TR-069 operates 24/7, using end users’ computers as a sensing platform is not
practical. To demonstrate that our sensor can be run on small embedded de-
vices, we initially experimented with the Raspberry Pi 3, a single-board ARM
computer. However, when used in a man-in-the-middle setup, where non-TR-069
traffic needs to be forwarded, we found its network performance unsatisfactory,
supposedly because its second LAN port is interfaced over USB. We ported our
sensor to OpenWrt [23], which can be run as operating system on a variety of
consumer and professional wireless routers. In contrast to single-board comput-
ers targeted to hobbyists, we found that – perhaps not unexpectedly – routers
are considerably better suited for our man-in-the-middle scenario as traffic for-
warding can be offloaded to the network interface.
We have used GL Tech’s GL-AR300M mini router to test the feasibility of
embedded sensor deployments. It runs OpenWrt on an 650MHz MIPS CPU with
128MB RAM, weighs 73 grams, consumes less than 3 watts of power, measures
58×58×25mm, and is available from Amazon for less than $US 35 at the time
of writing. The device features a dedicated hardware switch and programmable
indicator lights which we have used to provide users with control over our access
to their data (cf. Section A). When deployed as a sensor, collected data can be
viewed immediately in the sensor’s web interface, stored on an attached USB
device, or transmitted over the network.
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(b) TLS-protected sessions
Fig. 6: Evaluation of sensor performance: man-in-the-middle TR-069 monitoring
with 90Mbit/s load of forward traffic.
Sensor Performance When used in a man-in-the-middle attack setting, the
router needs to intercept TR-069 traffic and simultaneously forward all other
network communication. To evaluate its performance, we applied a constant
load of 90Mbit/s forward traffic and then gradually added TR-069 clients simu-
lating heavy TR-069 usage. Figure 6 shows the performance characteristics of the
sensor relative to the number of connected TR-069 clients. The proxy can handle
45 plaintext or 20 TLS-protected client sessions before significant increases in
latency and ultimately request failures are observed. The use of TLS induces an
additional latency of 1100ms due to asymmetric cryptography operations on the
device (we use 2048 bit RSA keys in our tests). The router’s price, size, power
consumption and performance fulfill our (informal) requirements so that we can
recommend it as a practical platform for TR-069 monitoring.
E Virtual Test Environment
freecwmp
(OpenWrt)
Sensor
Honeyclient Sensor
GenieACS
Collector
GenieACS
Web UI
Fig. 7: Schema of the Docker-based test environment.
One reason for the lack of TR-069 research could be that even basic inspection
requires quite complex setups and the lack of an open platform for research
represents a significant barrier [17]. While anyone can peek at their browser
traffic by opening the browser’s developer tools, TR-069 inspection typically
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requires a hardware device as client, a self-hosted configuration server to issue
commands, and some form of monitoring software. To lower the entry barrier for
TR-069 research and to test our monitoring software, we have built a network
of Docker [11] containers that emulates a full TR-069 environment on a single
machine.
Figure 7 depicts the basic network topology that can be spun up by invoking
docker-compose up. The test environment consists of two TR-069 clients – an
OpenWrt machine running freecwmp and our honeyclient –, GenieACS as the
configuration server, and our monitoring infrastructure in between. Interested
users can control clients using GenieACS’ web interface, manually interact with
the configuration server using the honeyclient, view traffic on each sensor’s web
interface, or process the data recorded by the collector. We hope that our work
is useful to other researchers starting to look at TR-069.
F Overview of TR-069 Remote Procedure Calls
The following table lists TR-069 Remote Procedure Calls (RPCs) that are
particularly interesting from a security and privacy perspective.
Client Server Name Description
l l GetRPCMethods Obtain the list of commands accepted by the ACS or
client, including vendor-specific methods
l Inform Inform ACS about device and its state after connection
establishment (see above).
l Get-/SetParameterValues Read/write parameters on the client. For example, this
can be used to set the wireless network SSID.
l Get-/SetParameterAttributes Read/write parameter attributes on the client. For ex-
ample, this can be used to instruct the client to notify
the ACS when a parameter changes.
l Add-/DeleteObject Modify parameter objects on the client. For example,
this can be used to add a device with a static IP address
to the router configuration.
l Download Download a file to the client and apply it. For example,
this can be use to install new firmware.
m Upload Upload a file from the client to the ACS. For example,
this can be used to upload diagnostic logs.
m ChangeDUState Install, update or uninstall additional software mod-
ules. For example, this can be used to enable additional
functionality a customer has purchased.
l denotes commands that the endpoint must be ready to receive and process,
m denotes optional commands.
See [6, p. 74] for a comprehensive list of commands.
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G Exemplary TR-069 Inform
POST / HTTP/1.1
Host: acs.example.com:7547
Authorization: Basic YmFzZTY0OiBpbnZhbGlkIGlucHV0Cg==
Content-Type: text/xml; charset="utf-8"
<cwmp:Inform>
<DeviceId>
<Manufacturer>AVM</Manufacturer>
<OUI>00040E</OUI>
<SerialNumber>001DEAD3BEEF2</SerialNumber>
</DeviceId>
<Event>
<EventCode>0 BOOTSTRAP</EventCode>
</Event>
<ParameterList>
<Name>InternetGatewayDevice.DeviceSummary</Name>
<Value>InternetGatewayDevice:1.4[](Baseline:2, EthernetLAN:1,
ADSLWAN:1, Time:2, IPPing:1, WiFiLAN:2, DeviceAssociation:1),
VoiceService:1.0[2](SIPEndpoint:1, Endpoint:1, TAEndpoint:1),
StorageService:1.0[1](Baseline:1, FTPServer:1, NetServer:1,
HTTPServer:1, UserAccess:1, VolumeConfig:1)</Value>
↪→
↪→
↪→
↪→
<Name>InternetGatewayDevice.DeviceInfo.SoftwareVersion</Name>
<Value>29.04.88</Value>
<Name>InternetGatewayDevice.WANDevice.1.WANConnectionDevice.1.WANIPCon c
nection.1.ExternalIPAddress</Name>↪→
<Value>10.0.0.4</Value>
</ParameterList>
</cwmp:Inform>
HTTP/1.1 200 OK
Content-Type: text/xml; charset="utf-8"
<cwmp:InformResponse></cwmp:InformResponse>
Example of an Inform command after performing a factory reset. Messages are heavily
condensed for brevity.
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